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U.S. Trade-Remedy Laws:
Do They Facilitate or Hinder
Free Trade?
“Our fair trade laws are the bedrock on which free trade stands.”
N INCREASiNGLY contentious issue in in-
ternational trade pertains to so-called “trade-
remedy laws.” These laws are intended to
remedy hardships for U.S. firms resulting from
the actions and policies of foreign firms and
governments. Allegedly, these laws produce a
“fair” and “free” trading environment. The
possibility exists, however, that the concept of
fair trade is simply a pretext used by interest
groups to pursue their own interests at the ex-
pense of the national interest. This can result in
a protectionist trading environment, which
lowers economic well-being in the United States,
rather than a fair and free one.
This paper provides an inti’oduction to U.S.
trade-remedy laws. As background to under-
standing the justification and effects of these
laws, the concepts of fair trade, free trade and
protectionism are described. Next, an overview
of the primary laws is provided. This is follow-
ed by evidence on the increasing use of trade-
remedy laws. Finally, evidence on the adminis-
tration and effects of these laws is examined to
assess competing claims that these laws facilitate
or hinder free trade.
LAIR TRADE FREE TRADE AND
PROTECTIONISM
To understand the controversy involving
trade-remedy laws, one must become familiar
with the basic concepts underlying the dispute.
The most elusive concept is that of fair trade.
On the surface, it is hard to argue against fair
trade; however, there are different interpreta-
tions of this term and, thus, its application in
concrete situations varies across individuals.
Two interpretations of fair trade are related
directly to differing impressions of reciprocity,
which is a concept of fairness used in interna-
tional trade negotiations.’ Before negotiations to
reduce trade barriers, two countries will gener-

















‘See Bhagwati and Irwin (1987) for a discussion of fair
trade and its relation to U.S. trade policy.
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riers. “First-difference” reciprocity means that a
fair outcome is characterized by reductions in
trade barriers such that the value received by
each country stemming from the other country’s
reduction in trade barriers is equal. Consequent.
ly, after the completion of negotiations, the two
countries may still retain different patterns of
trade barriers.
On the other hand, “full” reciprocity requires
that two countries allow identical access to their
respective markets, which implies identical
trade restrictions. Full reciprocity means that
reciprocity of access must be met for individual
sectors. This is known as a level playing field.
Negotiations under the auspices of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) use
first-difference reciprocity as a procedural de-
vice. Nonetheless, the implicit goal of GATT is
to generate a free trade environment, which im-
plies full reciprocity of market access. in such
an environment, certain actions, such as govern.
ment attempts to directly influence the pattern
of trade, are viewed as inappropriate and, thus,
can be counteracted.2
Even though actions taken to open foreign
markets and counteract inappropriate behavior
by foreign firms and governments can be justi-
fied in the name of fair and free trade, these
actions might not achieve their stated purpose.
If they do not, then the result is higher levels
of barriers with adverse consequences.
Trade restrictions tend to reduce the competi-
tion faced by domestic producers; this protec-
tion is at the expense of domestic consumers.
Empirical evidence shows clearly that the losses
suffered by consumers exceed the gains reaped
by domestic producers and government.3 Not
only are there inefficiencies associated with ex-
cessive domestic production and restricted con~
sumption, but there are costs associated with
both the enforcement of protectionist legislation
and attempts to influence trade policy. Empiri-
cal research also shows that the adverse effects
of protectionist policies persist because such
policies generate relatively lower growth rates
than free trade policies.
THE BASICS OF
TRADE-REMEDY LAWS
The United States employs various trade-
remedy laws to provide relief from imports for
U.S. industries. These laws are frequently char-
acterized as “contingent protection” because the
import relief is provided only under certain
conditions.~Table 1 lists the principal trade-
remedy laws and summarizes their key features.
The Escape Clause
The escape clause, contained in Section 201 of
the Trade Act of 1974, allows temporary import
barriers when rising imports can be shown to
injure a domestic industry seriously.~The legis-
lation requires that the increase in imports con-
stitutes “a substantial cause” of serious injury.
While a substantial cause is not defined precise-
ly, a working definition is that the cause is im-
portant and no less important than any other
cause of serious injury.
Two primary justifications exist for escape
clauses. The first justification relies on the im-
portance of an “economic adjustment” goal.
Rapidly increasing imports can harm selected
groups, especially import-competing domestic
firms and their workers. Such firms must adjust
to rising imports by enhancing productivity or
by laying-off employees. Proponents of the es-
cape clause argue that the costs of this adjust-
ment can be reduced if the firm is provided
temporary relief from imports.
This argument, however, has some problems.
Foremost is that there are numerous circum-
stances in which firms are forced to make ad-
justments. Changes in consumer demand, en~
ergy price shocks and governmental changes in
spending, taxation and regulation necessitate ad-
justments. If rising imports justify governmental
intervention, then it can be argued that these
28hagwati (1988) characterizes GATT as a ‘‘contractarian”
institution that regulates inappropriate actions. Political
pressures make it difficult to maintain a free trade stance
unilaterally, so GATT attempts to prevent those actions
that induce others to move away from free trade.
3See Coughlin et al. (1988) and Richardson (1989) for re-
cent surveys.
4Administered protection and procedural protectionism are
two other terms for contingent protection.
5Prior to 1974, escape clause legislation required that the
rising imports be due to a prior reduction of a trade bar-
rier. The elimination of this necessary relationship by the
Trade Act of 1974 appears to make U.S. law inconsistent
with GATI. See Jackson (1990) for a comparison of the







Principal U.S. Trade Law Provisions’
Criteria
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other causes of adjustment costs should be miti-
gated as well. While there are cases other than
-- rising imports that do lead to governmental in-
tervention, where should the line be drawn?
Another facet of the adjustment argument
focuses on the fact that rising imports provide
benefits to many consumers and impose costs
on relatively few firms and workers. An equity
argument can therefore be made for shifting
some of the burden of adjustment from the
few who are harmed to the many who benefit
through the tax on consumers imposed by im-
port restrictions.
The second primary justification for escape
clauses relates to this argument. A relatively
small yet potentially well-organized group harmed
6Lande and VanGrasstek (1986) note that the escape
clause allows member countries to impose trade restric-
tions to mitigate the perceived adverse effects of rising im-
ports, while remaining cognizant of their obligations to
JFltV/AFlflttST 1001after the filing of petitions. Significant declines
in sales, production, profits, wages or employ-
ment are evidence of serious injury.
Negative ITC decisions require a majority of
the commissioners to reject the petition and ter-
minate the process. Affirmative ITC decisions
require either a tie or the majority of the com-
missioners to accept the petition; they are for-
warded to the president. A recommendation as
to the appropriate trade restriction and/or ad-
justment assistance to prevent or ameliorate the
injury is included. The president, however, is
not bound by the JTC’s injury finding or its sug-
gested relief. Nevertheless, the Trade Act of
1974 instructs the president to provide relief
(which can take the various forms identified in
table 1), unless such relief is deemed not to be
in the national interest.
tin/air Trade .liegisiation
The escape clause allows a nation to restrain
imports regardless of whether the imports have
been assisted by “unfair” practices. Examined
below are the three most prominent pieces of
U.S. legislation that address the issue of offset-
ting the effects of unfair actions: 1) Section 701,
which deals with governments subsidizing ex-
ports; 2) Section 731, which deals with dump-
ing, that is, with foreign firms selling their
goods at lower prices in the United States than
in their home markets; and 3) Section 301, which
deals with violations of trade commitments and
a wide range of other actions.
S~tkn Till: Couaterv-niling lint:’
Leçislatinn
The legal purpose of countervailing duty legis-
lation is to offset government-provided benefits
that assist the exports of foreign firms. These
benefits include export subsidies, such as direct
government payments, tax relief and subsidized
loans to a nation’s exporters and low-interest
loans to foreign buyers. By inducing additional
foreign export activity as U.S. consumers substi-
tute these goods for similar domestically pro-
duced goods, these subsidies can injure import-
competing U.S. industries. Assuming certain
provisions are met, U.S. trade law allows sub-
sidized exports to be counteracted with tariffs
termed countervailing duties.
Even if one acknowledges that export subsi-
dies harm a domestic industry, it is possible to
question the wisdom of countervailing duties.
Many economists argue that if a foreign govern.
ment subsidizes exports, the importing coun-
try should accept the gift of cheaper goods.
Resources no longer needed by the import-
competing U.S. industries can be employed pro-
ductively in other sectors of the economy.
Countervailing duty legislation, however, fo-
cuses on the harm to these import-competing
industries and ignores the benefits reaped by
consumers and other producers.
Bhagwati (1988), while acknowledging the
economic validity of the preceding argument,
argues that a free trade regime might depend
on unfair trade legislation. Countries pursuing a
free trade policy find it difficult to resist the
demands for protection when the decline of an
industry is due to the market-determined advan-
tages of foreign producers. If the decline is due
to the use of export subsidies, demands for pro-
tection are heightened because issues of fairness
are stressed. A free trade regime that does not
counteract artificial advantages might find itself
unable to defend and perpetuate its free trade
stance.
The administration of countervailing duty
laws is the joint responsibility of the ITC and
the International Trade Administration (ITA) of
the Department of Commerce. The ITA deter-
mines the existence and magnitude of any sub-
sidy, negotiates agreements to offset any sub-
sidy, imposes duties, reviews the effectiveness
of the remedy and determines when the rem-
edy is terminated. Concurrently, the ITC applies
an injury test to determine whether subsidized
exports have caused or will threaten material
injury to a domestic industry or have retarded
the establishment of a domestic industry.’
Material injury, as defined by the Tariff Act
of 1930, is “harm which is not inconsequential,
immaterial, or unimportant.” While this defini-
tion is far from clear, the law does require that
the ITC incorporate volume, price and impact
considerations in its determination of harm. In
examining the volume of imports, the ITC is
charged with determining whether an increase
in that volume, either absolute or relative to
either U.S. consumption or production, is signif-
‘Lande and VanGrasstek (1986) point out that an injury test
is used in countervailing duty cases only when the foreign
country meets certain conditions. When an injury test is
not required, the ITA has complete control.1
Figure 1



















icant. With respect to the effect of imports on
prtces, the ITC looks fot significant price under-
cutting by the imports relattve to domestically
produced goods and attempts to assess the re-
sulting price consequences. Finally, the impact
on the domestic industry is assessed by examin-
ing changes in production, employment, market
share, profits and wages.
Countervailing duty cases begin when a peti-
tion is filed with the ITA and the ITC by either
an interested party or the ITA itself. (A complete
timetable for countervailing duty investigations
is provided in figure 1.) If the ITA concludes
that an investigation is warranted, then the ITC
must reach a preliminary determination as to
whether a “reasonable indication” of material in-
A preliminary affirmative ITA decision leads
to the announcement of a preliminary estimate
of the export subsidy and an order that import-
ers make a cash deposit or post a bond equal to
the estimate of the subsidy for each entry. If
the preliminary ITA decision is negative, no de-
posit or bond is posted; however, the ITA inves-
tigation continues until it reaches a final deci-
sion. If the final ITA decision is negative, then
the case is terminated; otherwise, the ITA must
determine the final subsidy margin.
An affirmative final determination by the IrA
leads to an ITC hearing in which all interested
jury exists. A negative 11 C determination termi
nates the proceedings, while a positive deter-
mination leads to additional investigation.
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parties participate. If the ITC finds no material
injury, then the case ends. On the other hand, a
finding of material injury by the nC leads to an
ITA order of countervailing duties against the
imported merchandise. Such an order continues
until revoked.
Set.lion 73.1: Anti-dumping .tegtslation
‘the legal purpose of anti-dumping legislation
is to prevent two unfair practices: it) price dis-
crimination in which foreign firms sell in the
United States at prices lower than they charge
in their home markets, and 2) export sales in the
United States at prices below the average total
cost of production.~Both practices tend to lower
the price of the good in the U.S. market causing
U.S. consumers to purchase less of similar do-
mestically produced goods. This decrease in de-
mand harms the domestic industry by reducing
profitability, sales, employment and other mea-
sures relative to a market without dumping.
Although domestic consumers do benefit from
the lower price, their interests are ignored by
this legislation.
Focusing on the first practice, if the ITA
determines that the product in question is being
sold in the United States at a price less than its
foreign market value, the case is referred to the
TTC. The ITC then investigates whether, as a
result of the dumping, a domestic industry is in-
jured, likely to be injured or prevented from be-
ing established.
The ITC’s assessment of material injury in
dumping cases is the same as in countervailing
duty cases. The 1TA’s determination of the
dumping margin, however, differs from the
determination of the subsidy margin. The dump-
ing margin is simply the difference between the
home market sales price and the export sales
price. While the concept of a dumping margin
is simple, applying the concept to the real world
is complicated.°Details on calculating the dump-
ing margin, which can affect the consequences
of this legislation, are highlighted later.
The administrative procedure for anti-dumping
cases is virtually identical to that of countervail-
ing duty cases. The primary difference is that
while an injury test is automatic in anti-dumping
cases, it may not be required in certain counter-
vailing duty cases. In addition, the timetable for
dumping investigations (provided in figure 2) is
longer.
Section 30.1 and the Anthoi’itv to Retaliate
Section 301 grants the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) authority (subject to any
directions from the president) to take all “appro-
priate and feasible action” to remove foreign
trade barriers that hinder U.S. exports and to
fight foreign subsidies that hinder U.S. exports
to third-country markets.” This legislation is
primarily a Congressional response to dissatis-
faction with GATT’s ineffectiveness in resolving
trade disputes.” Formally, Section 301 allows
the USTR to respond against any act, policy or
practice of a foreign country that is determined
to be~1) inconsistent with the provisions of, or
otherwise denies benefits to the United States
under, any trade agreement; or 2) unjustifiable,
unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or
restricts U.S. commerce.
Unreasonable is broadly defined in the Trade
and Tariff Act of 1984 so that offending foreign
restrictions are not limited to violations of trade
agreements. the term includes, and goes be-
yond, any act, policy or practice that denies fair
and equitable opportunities to begin arid oper-
ate a business. Unjustifiable, as well as discrim-
8Boltuck (1991) identifies international price discrimination,
promotional pricing, predatory pricing and hidden export
subsidies as instances of price dumping. Note that for
price dumping to be profitable, barriers must exist that
prevent the imported good from being resold in the ex-
porter’s market at the higher home market price. Interna-
tional price discrimination is profitable when an exporter
possesses more market power at home than in the United
States (that is, demand in the firm’s home market is less
elastic than in the United States) and charges a higher
price in its home market than in the United States. Promo-
tional pricing arises when an exporter induces consumers
in a foreign market to try a product by introducing it at a
low price. Predatory pricing is a rarely used strategy in
which an exporter attempts to eliminate competitors by
reducing the export price below its rival’s costs and below
its own production costs. Once the competitors have ex-
ited the market, the exporter raises the price. Finally, hid-
den export subsidies are classified as dumping either
because there is no direct subsidization or the TA is
unable to demonstrate the existence of a subsidy.
°SeeJackson (1990) for details on this complexity.
‘°ThePresident (rather than the USTR) had this authority
prior to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988,
“Although GATT is frequently involved in dispute-settlement
proceedings, it has no authority to impose sanctions or en-
force its decisions. A GATT ruling favorable to the United
States simply justifies unilateral U.S. action when the other
party does not abide by the decision. In addition, Section
301 allows for the settlement of trade disputes with coun-











































A Representative Case for the Section 301 Process
Lesser of 12 months (18 months for trade
agreement cases) OR 30 days after pro-
cedures end
Retaliation
45 days 30 days 30 days 30 days jr
It, ‘I tt
Petition USTR / / Unfairness President
filed takes decision gives
case by USTR ‘Specific
+ 4 direction
Federal Public Notice Public Federal if any’
register hearings for public hearings register to stop
notice hearings notice retaliation
SOURCE Grinots ~l989~
inatorv, includes any act, policy or practice that statutes. The US FR’s task is much more subjec-
denies either national or most-favored-nation tive because it mu t also dcvi e and pursue a
treatment. In the context of the United States negotiated settlement with a toreign
and a specific foreign country, national treat- government.
ment focuses on whether U.S. firms operating
in that country are treated as favorably as the If a negotiated settlement is not reached, the
firms of the foreign country are treated in the USTR may: 1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent
United States. Most-favored-nation treatment the application of, or refrain from proclaiming,
refers to the best treatment accorded to firms benefits of trade agreement concessions to carry
from any other country operating in a specific out a trade agreement with the foreign party in-
foreign country. Even though all foreign fii-ms volved; and 2) impose duties or other import
(including U.S firms) may be treated identically restrictions on the products of, and fees or
in a specific country, Section 301 could still be restrictions on the services of, such foreign par-
invoked if the treatment given were not as fav- ty. This retaliation can be applied to all coun-
orable as the treatment given the foreign firms tries or to selected countries. Furthermore, the
in the United States. retaliation can be applied to goods and services
other than those identified in the petition.
Similar to other trade remedy proceedings,
U.S. firms may formally petition to initiate Sec- In addition to dissatisfaction with the GATT
tion 301 proceedings or the USTR may initiate dispute-settlement process, Congress has been
the case. A typical case in which the petition is unhappy with the operation of Section 301.
filed with the USTR is illustrated in figure 3. Changes included in the Omnibus Trade and
The USTR’s role in Section 301 cases varies Competitiveness Act of 1988 generally reduce
from the roles of the ITA and ITC in other the president’s input into the process and en-
trade-remedy cases. The USTR acts as both courage more frequent use of Section 301.12 A
judge and advocate, while, relatively speaking, particular provision of the legislation known as
the ITA and ITC primarily judge on the basis of Super 301 reflected Congress’ desire to “get
the objective merits as defined by the relevant tough” with our foreign rivals and pry open
‘2See Grinols (1989).
FFnFpai PFSFRVF SANK OF ST I (IlLSDuring the 1980s, import-competing firms
throughout the world increasingly used anti-
dumping actions rather than countervailing duty
and escape clause actions.” As shown in table
2, this change has occurred in the United States
as well; however, this change is not as pro-
nounced in the United States as it is elsewhere.
From 1983 onward, anti-dumping actions in the
United States have exceeded 50 percent of the
total number of trade-remedy petitions. In fact,
the use of the escape clause mechanism has be-
come negligible. Since 1984, escape clause cases
have generally totaled less than 5 percent of the
petitions.
The total number of actions show a substan-
tial decline since 1987. However, to argue that
this decline indicates a sharp reduction in the
demand for protection would be erroneous. Be-
tween 1982 and t986, the total number of ac-
tions exceeded 100 cases in every year but one;
however, approximately 200 cases involving
steel products were initiated prior to the volun-
tary steel agreement of October t98415 In addi-
tion, the duties imposed under anti-dumping and
countervailing duty actions can persist for some
time.’°Similarly, other non-tariff barriers that
were negotiated and imposed as a result of the
pressure represented by anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing duty actions also persist for some
time. Thus, many industries had their concerns
resolved (at least temporarily) which resulted in




U.S. Trade-Remedy Petitions: Number and Percentage of Total
Countervailing Total
Escape clause Anti-dumping duty Section 301 petitions
1979 4 65% 16 258% 37 597% 5 81% 62
1980 2 54 24 64.9 11 29.7 0 0 37
1981 6 11.3 15 28.3 22 41.5 10 189 53
1982 1 0.5 63 29.2 145 671 7 3.2 216
1983 5 6.2 47 580 22 272 7 8.6 81
1982 6 45 73 54.9 52 39.1 2 15 133
1985 3 27 65 58.6 38 34.2 5 45 111
1986 3 29 70 66.7 26 24.8 6 5.7 105
1987 2 77 14 538 5 19.2 5 19.2 26
1988 2 32 40 64.5 13 210 7 11.3 62
1989 0 0 23 56.1 9 220 9 22.0 41
1990 1 1.8 43 768 8 14.3 4 71 56
SOURCE Escape clause. anti-dumping ano countervailing duty data fo’ 1979-1988 are from
Messerlin (1990~.The remaking years of data are from the Office of the United
Stales Traae Representative (1991) The data for Sect on 301. whrcn includes peti-
tions as well as cases instgated by the President of the United States and the USTR.



















their markets.” Super 301 required the USTR
to name (by May 30 of each year) those nations
with the most restrictive barriers to U.S. ex-
ports and to identify the specific practices that
most hinder U.S. exports. The listed countries
faced retaliatory measures if no agreement on
removing the trade barriei’s was reached within
12 to 18 months.
THE FREQUENCY OF TRADE-
REMEDY PETITIONS
‘3See Bhagwati and Patrick (1990), especially Chapter 1, for
an overview of the reasons for and the issues generated
by Super 301.
“See Messerlin (1990) for details.
‘5See Ahearn et al. (1990).
“According to the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (1991), 71 countervailing duty orders were
in effect at year-end 1990. These 71 orders exceed the
total number of countervailing duty petitions (61) between
1986 and 1990.
S12
The trend since 1987 of declining actions,
however, is not exhibited by Section 301 peti-
tions. On the other hand, there is no clear up-
ward trend either. Recent legislative changes in
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 suggest that this mechanism will assume
increasing importance in the future.
TR.ADE-REMEDY LAWS: THEIR
EFFECTS A.ND TRE ROLE OF
A.DMINISTRA’TlVE BIASES
To assess the consequences of trade-remedy
legislation, information on the frequency of these
petitions is supplemented with details of their
administration and outcome. The evidence pre-
sented below highlights biases in the administra-
tion of these laws and the proliferation of trade
barriers resulting from these cases. As a result,
it is highly unlikely that the legislation is facili-
tating free and fair trade.
The Negligible Effects oJ Escape
Clause Legislation
The small number of escape clause petitions
in recent years suggests that this trade-remedy
legislation is having virtually no effect on the
pattern of trade. The underlying criteria for a
successful petition, plus the possibility of for-
eign retaliation unless other U.S. trade barriers
are reduced, have deterred the use of escape
clause petitions and induced industries to seek
protection using other trade-remedy avenues.”
Despite the “requirement” that anti-dumping and
countervailing duty actions can be invoked only
to counteract the specific unfair trade practices
of dumping and export subsidies, industries
have increasingly resorted to these trade-
remedy laws rather than use the escape clause
route. This apparent anomaly is explained when
the administrative details of these less-than-fair
value procedures are scrutinized.
Effects of countervailing flute and
Anti-dumping Legislation and
Administrative Biases
Countervailing duty and anti-dumping actions
are associated with rising trade barriers. For ex-
ample, of 774 countervailing duty and anti-dump-
ing cases completed in the United States be-
tween 1980 and 1988, 70 percent were resolved
to restrict trade in some way.’8 Whether the
resulting duties, as well as the other negotiated
restrictions on trade, should be viewed as pro-
tectionist, however, requires additional
information.
Countervailing and anti-dumping duties can be
viewed as responses to actions taken by foreign
governments and firms. For example, if an in-
vestigation determines that dumping is occurr-
ing, then the U.S. response to impose a duty (a
dumping bond) equal to the dumping margin is
automatic. In this case, the effect of the duty is
to offset the injury to the domestic industry. If
each instance of dumping is counteracted, then
the net effect on trade would be zero in the
sense that the level of trade would return to
the same level prior to dumping. Many, how-
ever, do not feel that the actual workings of the
legislation are quite so benign.
~4dninistratim•~e .tiiases
Bias has been found to enter the administra-
tion of less-than-fair value statutes through their
interpretation by administrative agencies.’°The
administering agencies have discretion that is
sufficiently broad to allow for bias. For exam-
ple, Boltuck et al. (1991) conclude that the pro-
cedures used by the ITA in measuring subsidy
rates and dumping margins are biased toward
finding dumping and export subsidies.’°
A foreign firm is found to be dumping when
the price of their good in the U.S. market is
‘7Article XIX of GATT allows trading partners affected
adversely by an escape clause action to retaliate by
withdrawing “substantially equivalent concessions” affect-
ing the goods of the country invoking the escape clause.
An alternative is to provide compensation to these GATT
members by lowering trade barriers on their exports. See
Hamilton and Whattey (1990) and Lande and VanGrasstek
(1986) for additional details.
“See Finger and Murray (1990).
“Recent research has suggested another way that the ad-
ministration of this legislation could be biased. Moore (1990)
found that ITC anti-dumping decisions were biased toward
affirmative decisions when the complaining industry was
located in the state of a senator on the Senate Finance
Committee.
20See Kaplan (1991) for a demonstration of the protectionist






below: 1) the price of the good in its home mar-
ket; 2) the price of the good in a third market if
no home market exists; or 3) its production cost.
Such comparisons appear to be simple, but the
description below suggests otherwise. Similar-
ly, the measurement of subsidy rates appears
straightforward with the focus on devising ac-
counting rules to allocate government subsidies
across the volume of exports. Closer inspection,
however, indicates much complexity as well as
the potential for bias in these calculations.
The calculation of price dumping margins is
subject to error at four different stages: 1) in
identifying the home (domestic) market; 2) in
adjustments to make domestic and export prod-
ucts comparable; 3) in adjustments to calculate
the e~i factory price (that is, the price as it
leaves the factory) of domestic and export prod-
ucts; and 4) in comparing the e~v factory prices
of domestic and export products. Errors at the
first and last of these stages are illustrated.
The identification of the foreign firm’s home
market tends to produce the highest possible
fair value of the foreign good and, thus, the
largest possible dumping margin. To illustrate,
assume a firm occasionally charges a price be-
low its production cost in its home market. Such
sales are made in the “normal course of busi-
ness” for any firm in a competitive industry
that faces a demand for its product that varies
randomly.” Below-cost sales, that occur when
demand falls below its average level, are bal-
anced by above-cost sales, that occur when de-
mand is above its average level, allowing the
firm to earn a competitive rate of return. The
ITA, however, excludes all below-cost sales from
its calculation which raises the fair value of the
product and creates an upward bias in the
dumping margin.
The comparison between the e,x factory price
of individual sales in the foreign firm’s export
market (that is, the United States) to the average
e~ factory price in its domestic market can pro-
duce bias as well. For example, if prices were
declining and exports increased relative to home
sales during the period used to assess the exis-
tence of dumping by the foreign firm, then a
positive dumping margin would be found. The
low-priced export sales at the end of the period
and the high-priced home market sales at the
beginning of the period would generate a posi-
tive margin. Note that dumping would be found
in this case even if home and export prices were
identical for every sale made on the same day.”
In theory, the preceding bias should also oper-
ate in the other direction to generate negative
margins. In practice, however, this does not oc-
cur because the ITC excludes the possibility of
negative dumping, not only on average, but on
each individual price comparison. ‘Fhus, all ex-
port sales below fair market value carry a posi-
tive dumping margin, while all export sales
above fair market value carry a margin of zero.”
Consequently, a positive dumping margin will
be found even when all sales are made at the
same price on the same day and the weights on
each sale are identical.” Thus, this procedure
punishes foreign firms for not price discriminat-
ing because the only way to avoid dumping
duties is to charge substantially more in the


















‘1Fred Smith of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, as
quoted by Bovard (1987), notes, “If the same antidumping
laws applied to U.S. companies, every after-Christmas sate
in the country would be banned.”
22To illustrate this particular bias, assume the foreign firm’s
sates occur at the same ex factory price in both the United
States and its home market. Let the price be $10 in the
first half of the investigation period and $5 in the second
half. The firm sells five units both in the United States and
at home in the first half of the period and 15 units in the
United States and 10 at home in the second half, The
average home price is $6.67 because one-third of the
home sates occurred at $10 and two-thirds at $5. This
average price is compared to the individual sales prices in
the United States. Thus, each U.S. sale in the first half of
the period would show a negative dumping margin (that is,
dumping in the foreign firm’s home market rather than in
the United States) of $3.33 because the sales price of $10
exceeds the average home price of $6.67; each sale in the
second half of the period would show a positive dumping
margin of $1.67 because the sales price of $5 is tess than
$6.67. One-fourth of the U.S. sales would have a negative
dumping margin of $3.33, white three-fourths of the sates
would have a positive dumping margin of $1.67. If this
were the only bias in the ITA’s calculations, a positive
dumping margin of $42 would be calculated even though
no actual dumping occurred. Additional biases, however,
exacerbate the error further.
“In the numerical example in the preceding footnote, the
one-fourth of the U.S. sales with the negative dumping
margin of $3.33 would be treated as having a zero dump-
ing margin. This increases the calculated dumping margin
to S1.25 even though no actual dumping occurred.
‘4Boltuck et at. (1991) show that the bias in the margin
equals approximately one standard deviation of the prices
from the mean, Thus, if a company charges an identical
price in the United States and other markets and its prices
generally vary within 10 percent of the average price
charged, the TA witt calculate a dumping margin of 10
percent. In other words, if the firm’s average price is
$6.00, the bias in the dumping margin is about $60.14
Similar bias exists in the ITA’s calculation of
subsidies in countervailing duty cases, especially
when the subsidy is not in the form of a direct
per unit export subsidy. Biased accounting
methods provide one route for finding inequity.
For example, assume a foreign firm produces
more than one product and that one of the pro-
ducts is allegedly subsidized. If the firm is
found to be subsidized, the ITA allocates the en-
tire subsidy to the specific product that is the
focus of the investigation irrespective of the
degree, if any, to which the product is
subsidized.”
Because of these sources of bias, virtually
every investigation that proceeds to a formal
determination finds in favor of positive dumping
margins and export subsidies.’~Thus, less-than-
fair-value cases, similar to escape clause cases,
hinge on injury tests. Since the criteria for the
injury test are less stringent for less-than-fair-
value than they are for escape clause cases, the
infrequent usage of the escape clause is not sur-
prising.”
Duties and [Jncertaintv
The reasons for the protectionist conse-
quences of less-than-fair-value legislation are not
limited to biased administration. By law, any
dumping margin or export subsidy greater than
0.5 percent justifies an affirmative determina-
tion. While a small duty is unlikely to have a
large effect on competitiveness, the existence of
any anti-dumping and countervailing duties
cfeates costs of uncertainty that may have large
effects for the exporter. This possibility is
related to the fact that the importer (not the ex-
porter) assumes the risk of incurring higher
duties than those originally paid.
The bond initially posted on imports which
are subject to these duties is only an estimate of
the final duty. At the end of each year, the ITA
allows interested parties the right to request a
review of outstanding anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duty orders. Such a review will typically
require three to four years before the final du-
ty rate is set. Ifthere is no request for a review,
then the estimated deposit rate is equal to the
final duty rate.
The uncertainty over deposit rates means that
by importing under anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duty orders, importers are creating open-
ended contingent liabilities for themselves. Find-
ings of underpayment require additional pay-
ments including interest to the government for
the imports. To assess the risk of underpay-
ment, an importer must have substantial infor-
mation. For example, importers of goods subject
to countervailing duties must be knowledgeable
about the various industrial programs in the ex-
porting country and be able to assess the bias
that exists in the calculation of duties.’~
Iiarassment
Another line of argument suggesting the pro-
tectionist consequences of less-than-fair-value
legislation is known as the harassment thesis.
Gregory (1979) noted a barrage of administra-
tive complaints or court suits (35) filed by U.S.
electronic appliance and component manufac-
turers against Japanese competitors. He con-
cluded that even when these actions are not
directly successful, they impose lengthy and
costly delays on Japanese firms that indirectly
produce a protectionist result.
This harassment is not confined to Japanese
firms nor are the consequences limited to in-
creasing the cost of penetrating the U.S. mar-
ket. Firms from virtually all developed countries
as well as many developing countries have been
subjected to less-than-fair-value petitions.” While
these petitions directly increase the cost of pen-
etrating the U.S. market, the threat of a petition
also increases the risk of exporting to the United
States for actual and potential exporters. The
ultimate result is that foreign firms will reduce
their efforts to export to the United States.
“See Bottuck et at. (1991) for additional examples.
‘6See Finger and Murray (1990).
“The fact that the president cannot set aside affirmative
less-than-fair-value decisions but can set aside affirmative
escape clause decisions, and that less-than-fair-value
cases can be targeted against firms from specific coun-
tries white escape clause cases cannot, also explains the
relative use of tess-than-fair-value cases.
revenue with the U.S. Treasury that it coutd have retained.
Nonetheless, an exporter more concerned with short-term
profits from price discrimination than with a tong-term reta-
tionship with the importer might stilt find it profitable to
price discriminate.
“Finger and Murray (1990) note that before a firm files a
tess-than-fair-value petition, it frequently makes inquiries
with law firms and holds informal discussions with the ITA,
neither of which are kept secret. In effect, the period of
harassment can begin before an official complaint is
lodged.
problem is not so pronounced in the case of dump-
ing. An exporter that continued to dump would be sharinglyon-tan/f Barriers
As suggested by arguments discussing uncer-
tainty as well as harassment, less-than-fair-value
legislation can have protectionist consequences
apart from the actual duties resulting from
specific cases. Another route to protectionism is
that this legislation can result in the more fre-
quent use of non-tariff barriers. Finger (1981)
pointed out that less-than-fair-value mechanisms
can be used by a domestic industry to generate
public support for protection. Until all the stan-
dard means of seeking protection have been ex-
hausted, it is unlikely that there will be strong
political support for protection. Mechanisms
such as less-than-fair-value cases must be util-
ized prior to gaining access to more political
forms of protection. Many non-tariff bar-rices
originated as less-than-fair-value cases. For ex-
ample, Finger and Murray (1990) found that
nearly half of the less-than-fair-value cases in
the 1980s were superseded by some form of
negotiated export restraint.
The Else p1 Less-Than-Fair-Value
Legislation in Other Gountnies
A final line of argument suggesting that less-
than-fair-value cases lead to protectionism is
that these cases induce other less-than-fair-value
cases. As indicated by Messerlin (1990), this
avenue of protection was not used by develop-
ing countries through 1985. ‘I’he increased fre-
quency of these cases by developed countries
could have spurred their increased use by de-
veloping countries in the late 1980s. In 1988
more than 20 percent of anti-dumping actions
originated in developing countries. Some have
argued that use of this mechanism by develop-
ing countries is even more capricious than use
by developed countries because importers may
be subject to anti-dumping duties without either
due process or even formal notification.’” Thus,
the use of less-than-fair-value legislation in the
United States could backfire by generating addi-
tional inequities for U.S. producers—in this case,
exporters—and in subjecting international trade
to more barriers.”
Section 301 and Super 301:
Controversial Consequences
Although Super 301 has generated much con-
troversy since its passage, it has produced only
a small number of offenders and practices. In
1989, for example, Brazil was cited for quantita-
tive restrictions involving her balance of pay-
ments; Japan was cited both for technical bar-
riers to trade hindering forest products and
government procurement practices involving
supercomputers and satellites; and India was
cited for barriers limiting trade in foreign in-
surance services and for trade-related invest-
ment measures that imposed export performance
requirements on foreign investors. It is note-
worthy that these priority practices were not
necessarily those with the greatest export poten-
tial and that they were similar to those gener-
ally handled under Section 301. Nonetheless,
these Super 301 actions generated protests from
our major trading partners.”
Barfield (1990) criticizes the Super 301 process
because it is ultimately controlled by the same
political judgments the United States criticizes
other countries for using in their trade policy
decisions. For example, the naming of India and
Brazil was in retaliation for their role as leaders
of a group of developing countries that opposed
U.S. goals in the Uruguay Round.
The politicization charge can be levied against
the Section 301 process in general. Powell (1990)
argues that voluntary export restraints on steel
in the 1980s were highly politicized. In the
course of the 1984 presidential campaign, Re-
publican political leaders bowed to steel in-
dustry pressure for protection. Finding no other
avenue available, the USTR threatened to file
Section 301 cases unless numerous countries
agreed to limit steel exports.
Other ways also exist to manipulate Section
301 cases. For example, in November 1987, the
USTR invited public comment to identify po-
tential Brazilian imports as targets for retalia-
tory tariffs in a computer piracy case. Represen-



















“This point is made by Powell (1990) based on an interview
with Robert McNeitt, the executive vice chairman of the
Emergency Committee for American Trade.
‘1A related point is that the filing of anti-dumping petitions
in the United States is not limited to domestically owned
firms. As reported by Bradsher (1991), the American
manufacturing subsidiary of a Japanese company recently
asked the ITC to impose duties on the imports of a com-
petitor that is 48 percent British-owned. This new type of
trade complaint wilt likely cause some supporters of this
legislation to reconsider their positions as it becomes clear
that foreign-owned firms can benefit at the expense of
U.S. consumers.
“See Bhagwati and Patrick (1990), especially Part 3, for the
reactions to Section 301 by various U.S. trading partners.16
unrelated to computers, such as leather shoes
and dinner dishes, made appeals for retaliatory
tariffs of 100 percent to the USTR.
Barfield (1990) also criticizes Super 301 be-
cause it violates the fundamental premises of
GATT. GAIT relies on negotiated reciprocal re-
ductions of trade barriers on a multilateral basis
across many industries. Actions in which coun-
tries unilaterally define unfair practices and
force bilateral negotiations under a retaliation
threat are antithetical to GATI. Since GATT is
the foundation for an orderly world trading sys-
tem, it is quite difficult to accept any argument
suggesting that use of this legislation by the
United States can facilitate free trade. It is more
likely that other countries will develop their
own versions of 301 legislation and that they
will be used to counteract the United States. In
such an environment, trade barriers will pro-
bably rise rather than decline.
A more fundamental criticism of Section 301
(in general) and Super 301 (specifically) is that
trade retaliation and retaliatory threats are inef-
fective in opening foreign markets. After study-
ing a large number of cases, Powell (1990) con-
cluded that this “crowbar” approach generally
fails and that markets are opened because of
domestic conditions rather than external ones.
From 1975 through March 1990, only 13 of 79
Section 301 cases that were filed led to market
openings.” In many cases, countries have re-
sponded to retaliation by further closing their
markets.
Numerous reasons are offered to explain
the ineffectiveness and shortcomings of this ap-
proach to open foreign markets. First, nation-
alism in the target country is inspired by retali-
ation; a coercive attempt by a foreign govern-
ment tends to unite the target country against
the threat. Second, the target country reorients
its economy toward alternative suppliers and
markets. Firms and consumers in targeted coun-
tries can replace their transactions with the
United States by selhng to and purchasing from
other countries. Third, the government’s role in
the target country generally expands. This in-
tervention to manage the changes induced by
the retaliation involves trade-distorting policies,
many of which are difficult to eliminate once
they have been instituted. Fourth, the tougher
the sanctions, the larger the costs incurred by
the retaliating country in terms of higher con-
sumer and input prices.”
The preceding assessment, however, is not
shared by everyone. Ahearn et ah. (1990) note a
congressional perception in recent years that
Section 301 and Super 301 are working. The
1989 Super 301 complaints against Japan and
Brazil were resolved in 1990. In addition, South
Korea and Taiwan, both frequently mentioned
as potential targets of Super 301, made advance
concessions to avoid being named as priority
countries.” Nonetheless, even in situations
where this legislation is generating results, it is
far from clear that barriers to trade are actually
being reduced. For example, recent U.S-Japan
discussions (known as the Structural Im-
pediments Initiative) were largely a Section 301
negotiation. It can be questioned whether the
U.S-Japan agreement to reduce structural im-
pediments to trade, such as Japanese “conces-
sions” to review tax policies that favor agricul-
ture over new construction and American
“concessions” to reduce its budget deficit, will
promote a freer trading environment or even
reduce the U.S. bilateral trade deficit
with Japan.”
CONCLUSION
The allegedpurpose of nearly all trade-remedy
laws is to ensure that international competition
is fair. Certain commercial practices, such as
dumping and export subsidies, are viewed as
unfair and, thus, should be counteracted. The
elimination of these unfair practices will pro-
duce an economic environment in which the
“Powelt (1990) found that some openings for U.S. exports
to South Korea have led to new restrictions on imports
from other countries, especially those from Japan. Thus,
the South Korean market in not more open overall. White
the actions by South Korea have served the interests of
certain U.S. exporters, the actions reflect the fact that
political clout rather than economic efficiency is determin-
ing the pattern of trade.
‘4Numerous examples are avaitabte to suggest the harm, In
1988, President Reagan imposed 100 percent tariffs on
Brazilian paper products, pharmaceuticals and consumer
electronics as a result of a Section 301 petition alleging in-
adequate Brazilian protection of pharmaceutical patents. In
1982, President Reagan ordered higher steel tariffs and
more restrictive import quotas as a result of a petition
charging European steel subsidies. White U.S. steel pro-
ducers undoubtedly benefited, American manufacturers
that required competitively-priced steel as an input were
harmed.
“The 1989 Super 301 complaints involving two practices in
India remain to be resolved. A review is to be conducted
after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
“See Butler (1991) for details on these negotiations as well
as for a general overview of U.S-Japan trade.
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success of firms and resource suppliers depend
on their own performance in a competitive
market rather than on their access to gov-
ernment subsidies or the use of questionable
practices.
Reality, however, bears little resemblance to
the alleged purpose. Less-than-fair-value trade
laws, especially anti-dumping laws, are the most
frequently used trade-remedy laws and provide
potential relief from all imports, whether they
are traded fairly or unfairly. In fact, the opera-
tions of these laws are biased toward findings
of dumping and export subsidies. Therefore,
they have become standard devices to protect
specific domestic producer interests at the ex-
pense of domestic consumer and other pro-
ducer interests. In addition, U.S. less-than-fair-
value trade laws explicitly instruct ad-
ministrators to protect specific domestic pro-
ducers, while ignoring the interests of domestic
consumers and other domestic producers.
The costs imposed by the increasing use of
less-than-fair-value trade laws are not restricted
to the consequences of the actual import duties.
The threat of such cases leads to “voluntary”
agreements to limit trade, agreements that harm
potential importers. Furthermore, the uncer-
tainty associated with the actual duties collected
functions as a type of non-tariff barrier. Finally,
there is evidence that the use of trade-remedy
laws tends to encourage protectionism in other
countries.
Despite some instances where Section 301
and Super 301 cases might have had positive ef-
fects in liberalizing foreign markets, there is
substantial evidence suggesting that the crowbar
approach generally fails. Domestic conditions
rather than external pressures provide the pri-
mary motivation for the liberalization of mar-
kets. Nonetheless, there is a high probability
that this trade-remedy approach will he used
more frequently in the future. If so, then other
countries are likely to develop and use their
own versions of 301 legislation to counteract
the United States’ actions. Similar to the world’s
experience with hess-than-fair-value laws, protec-
tionism is a likely consequence.
Overall, the evidence is that trade-remedy
laws hinder rather than facilitate free trade.
U.S. fair trade laws can he more accurately
characterized as the bedrock for protectionism
rather than the bedrock for free trade. As such,
trade-remedy laws need to he remedied by ehim-
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